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Individualisation and Fertility 
Jens Ehrhardt & Martin Kohli  
Abstract: »Individualisierung und Fertilität«. In this paper, we discuss indi-
vidualisation theory as a parsimonious framework concept to describe and ex-
plain core points of fertility change in Western societies since the end of the 
19th century. We emphasise two dimensions of individualisation: firstly, the 
increase in status of the individual in cultural, social, economic and legal re-
spects (human dignity); secondly, the increase in autonomy and freedom of 
choice. In contrast to other approaches based on individualisation theory, we 
do not use the concept of self-realisation in the sense of an increased orienta-
tion towards purely individual interests, not least because this concept has 
failed before the renewed rise in fertility that has recently been observed in 
some advanced societies. 
We discuss the relevance of these two dimensions of individualisation in the 
context of the first transition and the 1960s with its declining fertility rates. 
Whereas the first demographic transition can be mainly explained by the rising 
status of children, which increased the costs of parenting and thus changed the 
interests of (potential) parents to have children, the transition in the 1960s re-
sulted mainly from the rising status of women in education and the labour 
market. An important but hitherto neglected change was the increasing divorce 
rates, as the possibility to dissolve a marriage devalued the traditional gender 
contract of the breadwinner/housewife model and decreased the willingness of 
women and men to invest in marriage and children. 
The contrast between the recently growing fertility rates in Sweden, France and 
the US with the continuously low fertility in the German-speaking countries 
can partly be seen as a result of different divorce regimes. Whereas the first 
group of countries has limited the entitlement to spousal support through ali-
monies, the second group has institutionalised extensive entitlements for moth-
ers. 
Keywords: first demographic transition, second demographic transition, fertil-
ity, individualisation, autonomy, human dignity, childhood, divorce, (legal) 
divorce regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing societal importance and valuation of the individual in terms of 
personal, cultural, social, economic and legal aspects and the associated expan-
sion of individual decision space are key long-term changes across the modern 
era, and particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries. This development has per-
meated all areas of society either directly or indirectly – including the family 
and fertility. Theories focusing on these individualisation processes therefore 
have an important contribution to make to demographic theory in general and 
to the explanation of fertility change in particular (see Hirschman 1994, Huin-
ink 2000).1 
Speaking of individualisation as an overarching change across modernity 
does not imply the one universal “grand narrative” that has become the target 
of much well-founded criticism in historical demography (cf. Szreter 2011, in 
this volume). Individualisation is a multidimensional term (see Kohli 1988, 
Luckes 2006, Berger and Hitzler 2010), which, in fertility analyses, can refer to 
all those concerned – women, men and children – as well as to all the institu-
tional arenas in which they live – from family to education, labour market and 
welfare state. The term can thus be used as an instrument for developing differ-
ent perspectives on the subject and for telling different “stories”. Individualisa-
tion is primarily a framework concept that needs to be defined more specifi-
cally, translated from the macro to the micro level, and combined with further 
arguments and theories.2 It does not evolve in a linear fashion but through 
ambivalences, contradictions and conflicts. It does, however, highlight some 
common features across these domains, providing some welcome theoretical 
integration in a field at risk of being abandoned to accounts of historical varia-
tion or even idiosyncrasy. 
Three main aspects of individualisation have been the focus of fertility theo-
ries to date. Firstly, autonomy and freedom of choice: In the context of the first 
demographic transition, this primarily concerned the issue of whether the de-
cline in fertility was the expression of a new modern mentality which enabled 
couples to make their own decisions about the number of offspring they 
wanted. Whereas, previously, this kind of family planning had been limited by 
norms and traditions, for example religious ones, so that it approached a state 
of “natural fertility” (Henry 1961; Wilson, Oeppen, and Pardoe 1988). Re-
search has since shown that family planning has been practised consistently 
throughout history (Ehmer 2011, in this volume), which means that the concept 
                                                             
1  In German sociology similar considerations have been advanced with the term “pluralisa-
tion” (e.g. Kaufmann 1995, 96-103). Historical demography has addressed individual 
emancipation processes and their effects on fertility with respect to gender (see, e.g. Sec-
combe 1992, McDonald 2000, cf. Szreter 2011). 
2  See Szołtysek (2007) for a discussion of the term ”framework concept” in the context of 
fertility research. 
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of “natural fertility” is not appropriate for a break separating a pre-modern 
from a modern era (Szreter 2011). For the second decline in the birth rate 
which started in the 1960s the issue is the extent to which marriages ended in 
divorce. Children were mostly born to married parents at this time and the 
traditional division of work in line with the breadwinner/housewife model 
depended on a stable marriage. If the increasing divorce rate throws the “con-
tractual” basis of traditional gender roles into question, this must result in a 
decreasing birth rate (see Davis 1984, 411). This dimension of individualisation 
– freedom of choice – refers to adults as they decide to continue or not continue 
their marriage, or to have or not have a (further) child, but not to children 
themselves as is the case with the other two dimensions. 
Secondly, individualisation can be conceptualised as human dignity, which 
in turn comprises various sub-categories, central among them the right to live, 
equality independent of origins or other characteristics such as religion or gen-
der, and the capability to live a full life within society (societal participation).3 
This last principle results in the necessity of increased investments in the up-
coming generations, depending on the current historical standard. Today, for 
example, a certain degree of education is a key prerequisite for societal partici-
pation. This is ensured by compulsory schooling, which was fully implemented 
in European societies at the turn of the 20th century. This issue relates indi-
vidualisation theories of fertility to those of family economics such as with the 
cost of parenting (e.g., Folbre 2008, with her “institutional economics of the 
family”). In an individualisation framework parental investment is not limited 
to purely financial factors but also includes love and bonding. This aspect of 
individualisation refers to parents or adults (for example, with the disappear-
ance of formal or informal marriage bans or the emancipation of women) but 
also to children. 
Thirdly, individualisation may also refer to the idea of individual self-
fulfilment (see Luckes 2006, 66-69), an aspect we will consider here in more 
detail as it is only mentioned briefly in the rest of this paper in reference to the 
increase in parental investment since the 1960s. It must be mentioned that the 
three aspects distinguished here are related to one another and that they repre-
sent ideal types. This means that freedom of choice is a prerequisite for self-
fulfilment; material (instead of merely formal) freedom of choice is itself not 
unconditional, but is based on education and the possibility of societal partici-
pation (empowerment). It is important, however, to distinguish between these 
dimensions analytically. The wide-spread equation of individualisation with 
individualism (in the sense of denying all common social values), or even with 
                                                             
3  The institutionalisation of the so-called “reproductive rights” in the catalogue of human 
rights should also be mentioned as a component of human dignity. Through these rights, 
individuals and couples are granted autonomy with their fertility decisions as against en-
croachments by population policies. 
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egoism (in the sense of refusing all social responsibility) is a misconception. 
Autonomy and freedom of choice mean that actions are conceived on the basis 
of the individual’s interests and values.4 It is possible to individually opt for 
commitment, including marriage and remaining with a partner, or for the duties 
of parenting. While it is true that the institutionalisation of individual autonomy 
increases the likelihood or risk of diverging from social norms and value tradi-
tions, it is also true that decisions made autonomously are more resilient than 
those made under the pressure of external norms or out of economic imperative 
(Luhmann 1965). 
The difference between autonomy and self-fulfilment may be illustrated 
through the example of marriage and parenthood. It is often assumed that self-
fulfilment goes hand in hand with a lack of commitment and an aversion to 
long-term responsibility; it follows that marriages would not stabilise because 
they stand in the path of an individual’s ongoing development and thus parent-
hood would become unlikely. Autonomy on the other hand means that people 
have the possibility to terminate unsuccessful marriages; however, they can 
also opt for the continuation of their marriage if this complies with their needs, 
desires or moral convictions. Autonomy also means that couples are free to 
decide to live together without having children; but just as well, they can make 
a decision to have a child or more children together. 
Ron Lesthaeghe (2011, in this volume) explains the decline in the birth rate 
in the 1960s and the low level of fertility since then as being due to an increas-
ing tendency towards “self-realisation” and “self-actualisation” in the sense 
mentioned above. In his view, this development is what distinguishes it from 
the first demographic transition which was characterised by higher parental 
investment and its consequences (Lesthaeghe 1983, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
1988). Dirk van de Kaa (1996, 425) neatly summarised this change as “from 
child-orientedness to self-orientation”. According to Lesthaeghe, self-reali-
sation and self-actualisation have increased in importance since the 1960s 
because of the growing level of prosperity and security as a result of economic 
growth and the expansion of the welfare state. Through this, material require-
ments and interests became less important whereas psychological needs be-
came more important. Lesthaeghe bases his argument on Maslow’s (1954) 
theory of the hierarchy of needs according to which the basic needs must be 
met before psychological needs (“higher order needs”, e.g., the need for self-
actualisation) can be addressed. He also links his explanation to the work of 
Ronald Inglehart (e.g. 1977) on value change through the succession of birth 
cohorts. In his view, because the proportion of people with a traditional mental-
ity is receding and the proportion of people with post-materialist attitudes is 
increasing, parents are limiting the number of children they choose to have and 
                                                             
4  This is explicated in particular detail in the literature on moral development (Kohlberg 
1981; Döbert, Habermas, and Nunner-Winkler 1977). 
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voluntary childlessness is on the rise. In line with this, a high fertility level is 
seen as the result of traditional values, social conventions and economic im-
peratives, which have been left behind in a free modern society (Morgan and 
King 2001, 8-10). Low birth rates look set to remain in the future: “The decline 
of fertility to below replacement level is an integral part of the Second Demo-
graphic Transition” (van de Kaa 2001a, 3486).  
Lesthaeghe’s and van de Kaa’s concepts continue to have wide appeal in so-
ciology and demography, and have given rise to a number of variations. How-
ever, there are now several counterarguments to this explanation of the decline 
in birth rate since the 1960s. The first is that the care and supervision of chil-
dren can be a form of self-fulfilment in itself (Huinink 2000, 369; see also van 
de Kaa 2001b). Children are an important medium for reflecting a person’s 
identity and values and for one’s self-understanding in terms of origin and 
future. Such a gain for self-reflection and self-knowledge may compensate for 
the burdens of caring for and committing to the child as it grows up. Parent-
hood is a lifelong commitment but the period in which parents are significantly 
restricted by their children is generally limited to the first few years of a child’s 
life. 
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, it may be argued that the in-
creased preference not to have children is the result of increased costs of par-
enting (e.g. Folbre 2008, 37) and increased insecurity about one’s parental 
investment (see below). In accordance with this argument, the preference 
would shift again if changes occurred in this respect. Amongst others, Peter 
McDonald (2000, 2006) has made this point with regards to women: while 
women today in Western societies have achieved (or successfully fought for) 
the same access to education and more equality in the world of work, the real-
ity and day-to-day organisation of families and family policy in many societies 
are still characterised by a strong orientation towards the traditional gender 
model. This means that women are forced to make a choice between two con-
tradictory spheres, with the consequence that many opt for an employment 
career and against children and the opportunity costs that children would entail. 
On the other hand, some societies – for example, France and Sweden – have 
diminished the career/family conflict for women and encouraged them to rec-
oncile one with the other through relevant infrastructures and on a symbolic 
level. The higher fertility rates in France and Sweden contradict this under-
standing of individualisation because one can not say that these two countries 
are less individualised than Germany or other countries with very low fertility. 
The finding of Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2009) that across advanced so-
cieties fertility is increasing again with rising levels of societal development 
should also be mentioned here. 
And finally, one could find fault with the fact that this argument refutes hu-
man nature. From an evolutionary point of view, it must be assumed that most 
people have a predisposition to reproduce. Although this predisposition varies 
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in prevalence (Kohler et al. 2006), the theories of evolutionary anthropology 
and biology oppose the idea that no one or only a few people have a desire to 
become parents. 
These arguments suggest that the significance of the “self-realisation” aspect 
of individualisation is overestimated in terms of fertility. For this reason, we 
will now base our discussion of some of the key characteristics and stages in 
the development of fertility in the 20th century on the two other aspects of 
individualisation, autonomy and human dignity. What significance do these 
aspects have, in which ways have they affected fertility and how do they relate 
to one another? 
The following section will examine the first demographic transition, and 
section 3 and 4 will take a closer look at the second decline in birth rate since 
the 1960s. The fifth section will address the variation in fertility among coun-
tries since the 1970s. This will be followed by a concluding section. We will 
attempt to gain a synthetic perspective, which, by way of necessity, must be 
selective and limited to illustrating the steps of our argument via some charac-
teristic findings. Some of the findings refer to Germany (and/or Austria and 
Switzerland), others are comparative across a wider range of Western coun-
tries. The comparison is focused on the countries with higher fertility, specifi-
cally, France, Sweden and the US. We will not be able to give a full discussion 
of the empirical evidence here but we hope to do justice to its basic thrust. 
2. The First Demographic Transition 
The first demographic transition is often explained via the rising importance of 
children and the rising investments of parents in their children. This argument 
is either embedded in a cultural framework – often with reference to Ariès 
(1962) – or in an economic framework. In terms of both cultural and material 
aspects, the increasing inclusion of children in education and the prohibition of 
child labour play a central role. From the perspective of life course theory, such 
state interventions were the expression of and part of the generalisation of the 
bourgeois family model, which defines the stage of childhood as characterised 
by learning and emotional security and not through gainful employment. John 
Caldwell (1982) neatly summarised the economic effect of this change: As a 
result of the prohibition on child labour and the enforcement of compulsory 
schooling, the intra-familial resource flow between parents and children was 
reversed. If parents are able to use and exploit the manpower of their children, 
this means that having children results in a material advantage and a higher 
interest in having many children. In contrast, if the economic advantage of 
having children is limited or turns into disadvantage, either as a result of the 
laws mentioned above, or as a result of structural changes in the labour market 
(demand for increasingly better qualified workers) or of a new social definition 
of childhood (through the values of individual development and self-
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fulfilment), children become cost factors so that resources flow from parent to 
child. According to Caldwell, this results in the reduction in the number of 
children or the avoidance of having children altogether. Family economics (e.g. 
Becker 1981) and the value-of-children approach (e.g. Nauck 2001) also award 
this argument central significance.5 
Caldwell’s definition only partly addresses the historical reality of the first 
demographic transition. This is because even though the contribution of chil-
dren to the household income was considerable in some regions and social 
groups, accounting for over 30% of the income in some cases (see e.g. Zelizer 
1985, 58 with extensive references for the US; Weissbach 1989 for France), 
such “lucrative” labour market conditions were the exception; and also because 
only a minority of children were engaged in gainful employment at the time of 
the implementation of these reforms. In the 1900 US census, for example, the 
proportion of children aged between 10 and 15 engaged in employment was 
only one sixth. This number underestimates their real economic value because 
it does not take into account the contribution of child labour on family-run 
farms, but other estimates also prove the generally limited economic signifi-
cance of child labour at this time. On the basis of a survey of “Paid employ-
ment of children in the home as well as in agriculture and its related indus-
tries”, Boentert (2007, 420-1) reports that in the German Empire in 1904, 
around one in five schoolchildren (up to the age of 14) had worked in agricul-
ture in the past 12 months; however, more than half of them only worked dur-
ing the harvest season, i.e. over a relatively short time span. Taking into ac-
count children who were employed by other households (7%), children in the 
service industry (just under 10%), in commercial factory work (less than 1%) 
and in cottage industries (hard to assess), Boentert (2007, 425) estimates a 
proportion of primary school children engaged in gainful employment of 
around 20 to 30%. This proportion is not high enough to explain such a sweep-
ing social change as the first demographic transition. One should also consider 
that the prohibition of child labour and the full implementation of compulsory 
schooling for children up to the age of 14 occurred at a time when school at-
                                                             
5  From an economic point of view, it is important to ask whether children, from birth to the 
time they moved out of the family home, made a positive contribution to the family income 
in pre-industrial and early industrial society (see Kaplan 1994, Caldwell 2005). This ques-
tion is difficult to answer empirically. In addition to the age that children started work, the 
amount of work they performed and their productivity (or the pay they received), other key 
factors include the time that the young adults left the family home and the levels of re-
sources consumed or contributed by them. Moreover, even if children used more than they 
contributed financially, it is still possible that they were of instrumental interest to their par-
ents when one considers their key benefit as “insurance” when the parents were no longer 
able to work, given that modern state provision of health insurance and old-age security 
only started to be set up at the time of the first demographic transition. 
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tendance had already achieved high levels in the upper and middle classes as 
well as in some groups of the working class.6 
However, the figures on the extent of child labour and its contribution to 
household income do demonstrate that abolishing it represented a major politi-
cal intervention with significant material consequences for the part of the popu-
lation that relied on it. These households had taken from them not only an 
important source of current income but also the insurance benefit associated 
with income from several sources.7 As a result of these reforms parenthood 
became significantly more expensive for these groups, which changed the basis 
for making fertility decisions. Similarly, families who already had children 
were plunged into material insecurity; this was one reason why the reforms 
could only be implemented after a longwinded, hard-fought process (see Cun-
ningham 1995, 105-6, 157-8) where the age limits were gradually set, the per-
missible duration of work was lowered and industries in which children were 
permitted to work were restricted. The increased economic productivity from 
which the workers could also finally benefit at the turn of the 20th century (see 
Wehler 1995) was a key requirement for the successful implementation of the 
reforms (see Basu 1999). 
How were these state interventions justified? In her analysis of the Ameri-
can discourse that accompanied the reforms, Zelizer (1985, 66-72) showed that 
proponents of the reforms based their arguments around the child, the love of 
the child and the concept of a “sacred childhood”. By comparison, their oppo-
nents emphasised parental autonomy (“parental rights”), economic interests, 
the socialising effect of work, or families’ financial dependence on child la-
bour. In Germany, considerations such as the demand of the economy for quali-
fied workers played a lesser role in public discourse.  
In comparison to the protection of the physical, mental and moral develop-
ment of children, the economic effects of a ban on child labour – whether po-
sitive or negative – were simply declared irrelevant. In the parliamentary de-
bates of the 1880s it was not even deemed necessary to mention the reasons 
for a complete ban on child labour in factories: child labour was simply no 
longer seen as appropriate (see Boentert 2007, 431). 
                                                             
6  After the end of their compulsory schooling, the majority of young people entered into 
regular work at the age of 15; they then contributed to the household income until they 
moved out of the family home (see Jessen 1955), and thus limited the costs of parenthood. 
This only changed in the 1960s with the expansion of education and the subsequent later 
entry into the labour market. At the same time it became unusual that an apprentice’s salary 
should be paid to the parents as board (de Regt 2004).  
7  This loss of income was compensated for in part by the increase in women’s employment 
(see Cunningham 1995, 89). The increase in female employment and the expansion of edu-
cational institutions have been used as indicators for the prohibition of child labour and thus 
for decreasing fertility (see Galloway, Hammel, and Lee 1994, 158). 
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The newly elevated status of children in the family and in society and its con-
sequences are a key topic of the writings of the Neo-Malthusians with their 
advocacy of birth control. An example is Robert Michels’ book on Sexual 
Ethics from 1911. Firstly, Michels points out the cost of having children and 
thus emphasises the necessity of family planning. Other writings and public 
statements at this period also highlighted the costs of having children instead of 
their benefits as a possible source of income (see Neuman 1978).  
A limitation of the number of the offspring is essential to the economic equi-
librium of the family. […]. This applies above all to the poorer classes. If the 
food supply of a household is barely sufficient for four persons, the increase 
of the family to eight will result in a definite insufficiency of nutriment. […] 
Even in those families which are sufficiently well off to be independent of 
such consideration for the grosser material needs, the parents must not forget 
the responsibility that they may incur to their children, and to the descendants 
of these, by a further sub-division of their patrimony (Michels 1911, 160, our 
translation). 
Importantly, Michels supplements the cost argument with normative and affec-
tive aspects and moves away from a perspective that focuses only on the par-
ents. The overall view of the various aspects highlights the extent of parental 
responsibility towards their children: “… to give life to a human being is so 
serious a matter that the mere thought of the responsibility thus assumed may 
well be profoundly alarming” (Michels 1911, 159). The gravity of this respon-
sibility may be a reason not to have children at all if one is not able to meet the 
expectations linked to parenthood (Michels 1911, 167).  
Step by step, Michels develops a complex and modern idea of parenting 
which approaches Kaufmann’s concept (1995) of “responsible parenthood”. 
The necessity of limiting the number of offspring is not just a result of the fact 
that children cause costs and that their basic needs have to be met, or that fami-
lies with high birth rates have a higher child mortality rate than one-child 
households. In addition, Michels also points out that “it is evidently far easier 
to provide a clear-sighted affection and a wisely-conceived and individualised 
upbringing for two or three children than it is for eight or nine”. However, this 
should not lead to an “overcultivation” or even suppression of the “precious 
individuality” of the child (Michels 1911, 162). 
The enhanced status of the child, its need for love, adequate parental support 
and for the acknowledgement of its individuality led to a reassessment of the 
roles in the family. If parental rights or the rights of the father had hitherto been 
seen as sacrosanct, they were now to be limited in several ways (see also Engel 
2010). Not only was the free usability of the child’s manpower done away 
with; the sexuality of the pater familias was also to be morally limited. To 
return to Michels once again: 
…it is despicable to bring children into the world without having provided 
guarantees for their loving reception, and without securing the probability that 
they will have a tolerable existence. This consideration altogether outweighs 
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that of the possible diminution of pleasure by the use of preventive measures. 
No father has the right, in pursuit of increased sexual pleasure, to procreate 
children for whom he will be unable to provide bread. The brief pleasure will 
be succeeded by long-enduring pain (Michels 1911, 178). 
Good material provision by a husband for his wife and children is a key com-
ponent of the breadwinner/housewife model of the bourgeois family that be-
came more generalised at the turn of the 20th century. The enhanced status of 
children and the related increases in their costs made contraception an impor-
tant prerequisite of this model and turned it into a component of masculine 
respectability (see Praz 2009; Seccombe 1992). 
Changes in the position of women in society also contributed to the limita-
tion of male supremacy and to the changes in couples’ fertility strategies. On 
the one hand, women fought for a life beyond the role of mother and became 
emancipated from the role of an “engine for procreation” (Gebärmaschine) 
(Michels 1911, 171; Gumplowicz 1909), which was often ridiculed in the jour-
nalism of the era (such as by the satirical magazine Simplizissimus). On the 
other hand, their sexuality and fertility were regulated by the change in the 
status of the child as well, which made it impossible for female-headed work-
ing class households to have families with many children by making use of 
their manpower (see Janssens 2007, 48). 
How do freedom of choice (autonomy) and human dignity (enhanced status 
of the person) as two aspects of individualisation relate to one another during 
the first demographic transition? We have argued that the changes in parental 
interests that resulted from the enhanced status of children necessitated a more 
intensive and consistent use of contraception. At the same time, and this was 
also explicated in Michels’ writings, the enhanced status of the child legiti-
mised a more intensive approach to family planning and led to a greater degree 
of autonomy for the couple in its fertility decisions. Speaking of changed inter-
ests undermines the contrast between “modern fertility behaviour” and a “natu-
ral fertility” regime that was asserted by the Princeton European Fertility Pro-
ject for many years (see Coale and Waktins 1986; Coale 1973, 65) but has 
since been disproved by historical demography (Szreter 2011). 
The enhanced status of the person in general and of the child in particular 
had various causes. One was the increasing orientation of society towards the 
here and now; therefore, secular goals such as welfare and quality of life could 
assume greater importance. Another cause was the diffusion and interpretation 
of human rights. On a structural level, changes in the employment system and 
the emergence of modern labour markets that required the existence of and 
access to free individuals also played a role. Due to the increasing demand for 
qualifications, higher investments in education became necessary. The individ-
ual assumed a higher value and therefore became more worthy of protection; at 
the same time, this resulted in less productive child labour becoming increas-
ingly superfluous. And finally, the role of the state was important, in the legal 
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and social implementation of the rights of the individual and the rights of the 
child as well as in the symbolic policies that celebrated these rights. These 
factors took effect in different social groups at different times and in different 
forms; thus, the fact that the decline in fertility during the first demographic 
transition occurred at different times for different social classes (Kertzer and 
Hogan 1989; Szreter 1996) can also be reconstructed from the perspective of 
individualisation theory. 
It should again be emphasised that the elevated status of children had an 
economical and an emotional side. An increasing emotionalisation of parent-
child relationships does not mean that these relationships were completely 
devoid of emotion before the first demographic transition (for a discussion see 
Becker 2001). Emotions and the bond between parent and child are based in 
biology (see Hrdy 2000). But these bonds are then anchored with cultural and 
social values (see Zelizer 1985; Cunningham 1995). Whatever the explanation 
for the increase in emotionalisation, it is indisputable that this change did oc-
cur. Zelizer (1985) speaks of the “sacralisation” of children and childhood. 
Children also assumed a new utopian potential: By creating “the new person” 
(den neuen Menschen), a very common concept at that time, it was possible to 
create a new and better society (e.g. Key 1902). In this respect, teachers and 
mothers could be seen as revolutionary forces. 
3. The Second Demographic Transition 
The 1960s saw a renewed elevation in the status of children, which covered 
legal as well as economic, social and emotional aspects. Similar to the first 
demographic transition, the rising amount of time spent in formal education 
played an important role and led to another increase in the cost of parenting. 
The change in West Germany is cited here as an example. The mid-1950s 
saw the initiation of the debate on educational reform. A key protagonist in this 
process was the German Committee for Education, which was set up as a Fed-
eral Commission in 1953 and delivered a large number of recommendations 
right up to its break-up in 1965. In 1954, for example, it supported the intro-
duction of a ninth compulsory year of schooling at primary level (introduced in 
1964), and in 1959 it suggested in its landmark Outline for the Reorganisation 
and Standardisation of General Education Schooling that the streaming of 
pupils for the three-tier school system should only take place after the sixth 
year of school. The tone of the reform debate became more heated when Georg 
Picht, a member of the Committee until 1963, highlighted the “German educa-
tion crisis” in a series of articles in Christ und Welt (1964), which had a great 
impact on public opinion; one year later, he received the Theodor-Heuss-Prize 
for his contribution to educational policy. Picht primarily supported the mod-
ernisation of rural primary school education, which continued to be character-
ised by single-stage classes (with eight year groups in one class) and separation 
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along denominational lines; secondly, he wanted to double the number of pu-
pils completing secondary school and thirdly, he supported the proper educa-
tion of teachers to be able to do this, which entailed the expansion of the uni-
versities (Picht 1964, 68). 
Parents and their interests played a minor role in Picht’s argument, which 
had mostly a policy focus on financing opportunities, decision-making and 
organisational structures, Germany’s position internationally and the signifi-
cance of education for the modern economy. Parents’ interests are only men-
tioned once in a short passage:  
The educational expectations of pupils and their parents are the same in a vil-
lage as in a city; our school system therefore penalises the parental rights (El-
ternrecht), so often quoted in other contexts, if it prevents parents from giving 
their children the education they need for life (Picht 1964, 38). 
Ralf Dahrendorf, who made another key contribution to the debate on educa-
tional reform with his book Education Is a Civil Right: the Plea for an Active 
Educational Policy (Dahrendorf 1965a), also avoids addressing the material 
interests of parents. Just like Picht, the possibility of differing economic inter-
ests between parents are children are not brought into the equation, although 
Dahrendorf continually emphasised the significance of material differences in 
his writings on social inequality (particularly in his critique of Schlesky’s so-
cial levelling hypothesis). In the context of children and education, this does 
not appear to play a role; here, Dahrendorf views school and family as compet-
ing institutions and parental rights as a vehicle for limiting the influence of 
public concerns – with negative consequences for the modern democratic way 
of thinking that children need to develop. Children need school in order to learn 
“social values” and to become responsible citizens (Dahrendorf 1965b). “Edu-
cation is a civil right” and so additional costs for the parents resulting from 
prolonged education (even if the state provides free schooling) should not play 
a role. 
In contrast to the tone of the debate on education reform, the general public 
was well aware of the costs of having children and providing for their educa-
tion. In 1958, only 52% of West German survey participants over the age of 18 
supported the introduction of a ninth year of compulsory schooling at the pri-
mary level; 32% were against it and 16% were undecided. 78% of survey par-
ticipants said they were against a tenth year of compulsory schooling – mainly 
for the reason that young people would be too old for an apprenticeship after 
ten years of compulsory schooling, or that being able to earn anything would be 
delayed for too long (Institut für Demoskopie 1965, 350). 
In the 1950s, education for West Germans was still mainly limited to pri-
mary school, with only a minority continuing on to secondary school. Accord-
ing to Schimpl-Neimanns (2000, 651), around 14% of 14 to 18-year olds in 
1950 attended secondary school or left school with these qualifications; in 1960 
this figure was 23%, and in 1970, 35%. The proportion of young people going 
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on to university also increased significantly in this period. While the proportion 
of 22-year-olds going on to university was around 2% in 1952, it rose to around 
6% by 1966, and after a short temporary decline, doubled by 1973. 
Both men and women benefited from this development; however, the gap 
between the sexes was only really closed in the late 1990s (Lundgreen 2008, 
89). In addition to the change in proportions of men and women in education, 
the rural/urban ratio also changed significantly; rural areas with weaker infra-
structure saw a rapid development and thus regional imbalances began to 
equalise (e.g. Wirtschaft und Statistik 1970, 597-8). 
The expansion of education led to a major cultural change for society and 
for families, and a change in conditions for fertility decisions. The rising costs 
as a result of the increased proportion of children going on to secondary school 
were partially offset by the increases in household income; however, the rise in 
the cost of education could be very high in families with many children be-
cause of the rising acceptance of the norm of equality, which meant that parents 
increasingly treated sons and daughters the same way, and that adopting differ-
ent strategies of investment in children depending on birth order became less 
and less legitimate. 
It should be added that the educational expansion also influenced fertility 
via other mechanisms such as the increased age of couples at the time of mar-
riage (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991). 
In addition to education, the status of the child was also elevated by the re-
definition of its legal position. Triggered by the 1959 UN Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, several rulings by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
played a key role – particularly the rulings on adoption law and on the legal 
position of children born out of wedlock. These rulings gave children more 
independence from their parents, with parental authority being increasingly 
limited by the well-being of the child. In the ruling on “parental authority” in 
1959 (BVerfGE 10, 59; 29 July 1959), which put mothers and fathers on equal 
terms with regard to their authority in raising children, “paternal authority was 
declared no longer a right to rule but a right that came with responsibility, a 
social right which is linked to the duty to ensure the well-being of the child” 
(BVerfGE 10, 59). In its ruling on the revision of the adoption procedure 
(BVerfGE 24, 119; 29 July 1968), the Constitutional Court clarified that the 
issue of a disturbance of family life could not only be assessed from the par-
ent’s point of view because ”the child also belongs to the family” (BVerfGE 
24, 119). Parents have the right  
to care for and raise their children however they wish [...]. However, the pro-
tection of this fundamental right may only be considered for actions that could 
be evaluated as in the interests of the well-being and education of the child, 
and not the opposite: the neglect of the child. (BVerfGE 24, 119). 
The state itself is therefore  
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not only authorised but obliged to ensure the well-being and education of the 
child. This obligation of the state does not arise from the legitimate interest of 
the social community in the education of younger generations […] or from the 
general point of view of public policy; it is primarily because the child is also 
entitled to basic rights and thus has a claim to the protection of the state. The 
child is a person with his/her own dignity and his/her own right to the devel-
opment of an individual personality […] (BVerfGE 24, 119). 
These new rulings redefined the position of children born out of wedlock 
(BVerfGE 25, 167; 29 January 1969) just as foster homes were being reformed 
and humanised. The threat “If you misbehave, we’ll send you to a home”, 
which was carried out frequently still in the 1950s and 1960s, lost its power to 
frighten and finally disappeared altogether (Köster 2003; Wensierski 2006). 
Parent/child relationships not only became less hierarchical in the 1960s 
(see Horkheimer 1936 for a critique of the German family in the 1930s), par-
ents also developed new educational objectives and styles. In addition to the 
traditional virtues of tidiness, hard work and cleanliness, new individualised 
goals were adopted that focussed on the autonomy and responsibility of the 
child (cf. Alwin 1989). 
The emotionalisation of the parent/child relationship also continued to inten-
sify (Spree 1992). It had emerged during the first demographic transition (see 
above), but took on new forms under the growing influence of developmental 
psychology (e.g. Bowlby 1953). This attracted more attention to the vulnerabil-
ity of the child and the possibility of lasting psychological repercussions. Par-
enthood that supplied a continual flow of parental love and material resources 
was now seen as a prerequisite for good child development. 
4. Divorce and Fertility Decline in the 1960s 
Increased costs of parenting are a major consequence of individualisation in 
terms of the elevated status of the child. Their influence on fertility has been 
widely discussed in the demographic literature – starting with the groundbreak-
ing work on the economics of the family by Gary Becker (1981). Another 
aspect of individualisation is the improved status of women. This has also been 
well-documented, be it at the economic and social micro level with reference to 
the opportunity costs of motherhood, which are increasing with women’s in-
creasing formal education; or at the macro level with reference to the varying 
speed of progress towards equality in the different institutional fields and the 
dilemma that arises for women who decide to have children (McDonald 2000, 
2006). A further consequence of individualisation has been neglected thus far 
in fertility research, however, and that is the increasing frequency of divorce. 
We will take a closer look at this aspect here. 
In West Germany, the divorce rate increased rapidly from the mid-1960s 
and stabilised in the 1980s at a high level, with temporary fluctuations as the 
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result of specific legal changes or of economic downturns.8 A similar develop-
ment could be observed in Austria and Switzerland and in most other devel-
oped Western societies. However, there are also significant differences be-
tween these countries, for example, the particularly high divorce rates in the US 
and Sweden and the considerable delay to development in southern Europe and 
Ireland as a result of the influence of the Catholic Church.  
In the course of the surge of individualisation in the 1960s, larger and larger 
population groups became emancipated from the hitherto restrictive marriage 
laws that limited divorce, thus enforcing law reforms in the subsequent years. 
These reforms were, in some respects, catching up on earlier developments (the 
sudden rapid increase in divorce rates and the subsequent stabilisation is an 
indicator of the slow pace of reforms up to that point): For one thing, the first 
‘modern’ divorce law was adopted in 1792 during the time of the French Revo-
lution (it remained in force until 1815, see Desan 2004); there was also a liber-
alisation of marriage law in Sweden in 1915, which was adopted in similar 
forms by the other Scandinavian countries. And for another thing, the concept 
concerned the transfer of a “basic structural principle” of modern societies to 
the area of the family, which, up to that point, had been subjected to completely 
different regulations. In the domains of company and labour law, associations 
have been characterised by a (relatively) straightforward “exit right” since the 
beginning of the 19th century.9 The claim that this could also apply to marriage 
suggested itself but was in conflict with the traditional legal and social concept 
of marriage as a lifelong bond. The idea of a freer and more individual model 
for marriage had already been developed much earlier but it was only in the 
1960s that it could replace the conservative model in social and legal terms. 
Within a few years, the previously widespread concept of an “unbreakable 
lifelong bond” had been replaced by a partnership with an exit clause. Since 
this change, no one now has the certainty that their marriage will last until 
either their own death or that of their spouse. Research into the causes of di-
vorce has been able to identify specific risk factors (see e.g. Wagner 1997; 
                                                             
8  In 1965 there were 1.1 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in West Germany, in 1985 there were 
2.3 (German Federal Statistical Office). 10% of the marriages established in 1950 were di-
vorced in the following 25 years; this figure increases to 32% for the marriage cohort of 
1980.  
9  “Negative freedom of association” is a fundamental right and is protected in Germany by 
Article 9 of the constitution. The freedom to found an organisation is inseparable from the 
freedom to leave or not to join an organisation. Transferring this principle to marriage is 
limited in Germany insofar as the spouses’ freedom of contract (in the marriage contract) is 
restricted (see Braeuer 2003), and exiting the marriage via divorce has significant legal and 
financial consequences. If one follows the argument of Hirschman (1974) and transfers it to 
marriage, it may be the case that the exit option has increased the quality of marriage. Thus, 
the observation of Nave-Herz (1990) that higher demands on marriages have led to an in-
crease in the divorce rate only refers to one direction of the causal relationship between the 
two parameters.  
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Klein and Kopp 1999; Wagner and Weiss 2003), but it cannot be said that the 
risk of divorce is limited to a few “problem groups”. 
How are divorce and fertility related? At the macro level, i.e. aggregate na-
tional rates over a period of time, most countries initially show a highly nega-
tive correlation with curves that are almost mirror images of one another. How-
ever, the relationship of both parameters differentiates itself in the subsequent 
period (see also Billari and Kohler 2004, 163). While fertility rates went up 
again in France, Sweden and the US after some time, which seems to indicate 
that the negative effect of divorce on fertility has declined over the course of 
time and finally disappeared, divorce in Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
continues to have a negative effect on fertility; the high divorce level and the 
low fertility level are stabilising in these countries, in other words, fertility 
behaviour is not adapting to the new conditions. 
At the micro level, three different effects of divorce on fertility have been 
discussed. The first is the lower fertility after a divorce (as documented by 
research into the consequences of divorce). This effect can be partially attrib-
uted to the lack of a partner or the necessary time for establishing a new part-
nership, and partially to the lower fertility of second marriages, which is mainly 
due to the higher age of divorced women (see Klein and Eckhard 2004; Jansen, 
Wijckmans and van Bavel 2001). Some sub-groups of people remarrying have 
the opportunity to have an above-average number of children but in general 
second marriages are associated with lower fertility rates.  
The second option for examining this relationship is by looking at research 
on marriages and couple relationships. As shown by Thornton (1978), for 
example, fertility decreases within a partnership even before the divorce be-
cause the quality of marital interaction has a positive influence on fertility (see 
also Brüderl et al. 2003) and because reproductive behaviour is influenced by 
the perceived individual risk of divorce. For the US from 1980 to 1992, Myers 
(1997, 1281) demonstrated that the perceived risk of divorce particularly re-
duced the likelihood of having second and third children, while the transition to 
the first child was not so negatively influenced. This confirmed the results of 
Lillard and Waite (1993) for the US before 1985. Rijken and Liefbroer (2009) 
show with data from the Panel Study on Social Integration in the Netherlands 
(1987, 1991, 1995) that negatively evaluated interactions between spouses 
significantly lower the likelihood of the birth of a child.  
Thirdly, one can discuss the correlation between divorce and fertility by as-
suming a general anticipatory perspective towards divorce. This means that the 
relationship quality in a specific marriage and the risk associated with it is less 
of an impact factor than a general awareness of risk. To adapt one’s actions to 
perceived risks is surely a well-founded concern in respect of the high invest-
ments required by marriage and parenthood. Initially, the awareness of risk 
related to the provision of financial support for spouses:  
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The exploding divorce rate struck at the heart of the nineteenth century sex ro-
le system. If a young wife could not count on her husband’s remaining mar-
ried to her, she could not count on his support either. Divorce thus broke the 
central bargain of marriage by which a woman traded her services as wife and 
mother for financial support of the husband (Davis 1984, 411). 
Now the awareness of risk also applies to parenthood. Stevenson (2007) and 
Drewianka (2008) showed that the states in the US that have the option of 
“unilateral exit” demonstrate a negative (if only small) anticipation effect on 
fertility; according to these studies, the regulation of the division of conjugal 
property also leads to small differences in reproductive behaviour. 
If the risks of divorce are higher for women in general, and particularly as a 
result of specific aspects of divorce law, this not only lowers fertility but at the 
same time raises women’s labour market orientation (Stevenson 2007, 2008). 
This is hardly surprising: research into the consequences of divorce has con-
firmed Davis’s (1984) view on the disintegration of the traditional gender con-
tract and has shown that women incur heavy financial losses after a divorce if 
they have occupied the role of housewife in a traditional gender arrangement 
and were not employed (see e.g. Petersen 1996; Andress 2003; Andress 2009). 
In this respect, it is safe to assume with Diekmann (1994) that the anticipation 
of an increased risk of divorce has resulted in higher levels of women in em-
ployment (see also BMFSFJ 2005, 218).10 
This adaptive behaviour is confirmed by the results of the research on the 
(temporal) process of divorce (cf. Herzer 1998). Johnson and Skinner (1986) 
observed the employment patterns of married couples from 1969 to 1977 using 
the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They were able to 
show that female labour force participation increases significantly before a 
divorce: Three years before the divorce, the proportion of married women in 
employment was 67%; it then increased to 71% (two years) and 76% (one 
year), to reach the 85% mark in the year of the divorce (Johnson and Skinner 
1986, 457). Multivariate analyses show that the risk of divorce has particularly 
increased the employment rate of white women with little previous labour 
market experience (see also Greene and Quester 1982). 
In comparison to these early studies, where the risk of divorce was estimated 
indirectly through socio-structural parameters, the subjective perception of the 
risk of divorce was directly assessed in the studies by South, Bose and Trent 
(2004) for the US, and by Beck and Hartmann (1999) for Germany. South, 
Bose and Trent (2004, 14) reported a significant increase in the number of 
working hours for women who considered divorce a possibility in their mar-
riage (only those partnerships that still existed at the time of the second survey 
                                                             
10  In order to determine the influence of women’s employment or of fertility on divorce, the 
effects in the other causal direction must also be considered (Beck and Hartmann 1999). 
This also applies to the influence of women’s employment on fertility. 
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were included in the analysis). If the female respondents estimated the risk as 
“low” but possible, they showed a significant increase in the number of work-
ing hours over those who considered their marriage at “very low” risk of di-
vorce. Beck and Hartmann (1999, 668) show that, in West Germany (but not in 
East Germany), “suggesting a divorce” or “thinking of marriage difficulties” 
significantly increased women’s transition into employment. 
The increase in divorce rates therefore contributes to the explanation of the 
fertility decline the 1960s and 1970s. On the basis of the three approaches 
outlined (research into consequences of divorce, into marriages and couple 
relationships, and into anticipation of the general risk of divorce), we may 
assume an opposite trend as well: that fertility decreases less severely after a 
divorce because the status of being ‘divorced’ is no longer stigmatised and an 
active marriage market for second marriages or partnerships has evolved. It 
also seems to be true that the social normalisation of divorce should lessen the 
intensity of divorce conflicts between the (ex-)spouses. Research on couple 
relationships and on the divorce process has documented such adaptation pro-
cesses and a decrease in the severity of effects. If the stigmatisation effect 
decreases, spouses will file for divorce more quickly if a marriage is compro-
mised (and thus increase their chances of remarriage); simplified legal proce-
dures should reduce waiting times in divorce proceedings so that less time is 
lost and a new partnership may be formed more quickly. Finally, from the 
anticipatory perspective, we may assume an adaptation process and a reduction 
in the negative effect of divorce on fertility if women are made less vulnerable 
to divorce through higher employment integration. As a result, men are sub-
jected to less of a financial burden after a divorce. 
Female labour force participation has increased dramatically in Europe and 
the US in the past four decades. In 1970, it amounted to between 45 and 50% 
for women between the ages of 24 to 55 in West Germany and France (OECD 
Employment and Labour Market Statistics); by 2008 it had increased to around 
75% (similar for Austria). In Sweden and the US, these proportions are higher; 
however, the difference to West Germany declined from around 15 to 20 per-
centage points in 1970 to around 10 percentage points in 2008.  
With regard to the proportion of women in part-time employment, however, 
there continue to be significant differences between countries. Countries with 
low fertility rates such as Germany and Austria have seen the proportion of 
part-time workers increase since 1980, while the countries with higher fertility 
have seen it decrease (Sweden) or stay the same (France). Part-time work (up 
to 29 hours/week) accounts for 30 to 40% of employed women in Germany and 
Austria; while in Sweden the proportion is only around 15%, and in France, 
around 20% (OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics). The increase 
in women’s employment in the past few decades has therefore taken different 
forms (see e.g. Grunow, Hofmeister and Buchholz 2006; BMFSFJ 2005, 51; 
Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rohwer 1999).  
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If we compare Sweden and France with Germany and Austria, we may con-
clude that the lower labour market integration of women in the second two 
countries is a reflection on the difficulty of reconciling work and motherhood, 
as Sweden and France both have well-developed and easy-to-access public 
provision of childcare. The US, however, does not fit this pattern because 
childcare there is almost exclusively private or commercial as a result of the 
almost complete lack of any public provision. In order to explain why fertility 
levels remain high in the US despite this, it is necessary to take into account the 
conditions on the American labour market (Preston and Hartnett 2008): on the 
one hand, there is a large low-wage sector, which makes market-based child-
care more affordable; on the other hand, it is easier to re-enter or step up em-
ployment after taking a break to look after children. There are also cultural 
differences, in particular the stronger religious orientation of American society. 
A further dimension of cultural differences is represented by the strength of 
traditional gender roles (see e.g. Grunow, Hofmeister and Buchholz 2006, 
122).11 This can be seen in the attitudes towards working mothers. In 2000, two 
thirds of western German 30 to 40-year-olds agreed with the statement that “a 
young child [...] would definitely suffer if his/her mother is employed” 
(Kreyenfeld 2002). Part-time work can therefore be seen as a partial moderni-
sation which allows women to fulfil the perceived emotional demands of a 
child and also the traditional female gender role. However, this comes with the 
price of lower protection against the financial risks of divorce.  
5. The Regulation of Divorce Consequences 
Regarding the legal preconditions for exit from marriage – that is, the introduc-
tion of unilateral divorce or moving away from the principle of consensus, and 
the replacement of the at-fault principle with the principle of marriage break-
down (see e.g. Limbach and Willutzi 2002) – there are no longer any major 
differences between the high and low fertility countries mentioned (see the 
overview in Kneip and Bauer 2009, 594) that could be used to explain differ-
ences in reproductive behaviour. The two groups of countries differ greatly; 
however, when it comes to the legal consequences of divorce, in line with the 
findings presented above (see, in particular, Glendon 1989; Verschraegen 
2007; Hofer 2003). Until now, this has generally not been addressed outside the 
sphere of comparative legal studies. While marital solidarity is mostly limited 
to the duration of the marriage in France, Sweden and the US, this is not the 
case in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Since the early/mid-1970s, alimony 
payments after a divorce are usually only guaranteed for a short period and at a 
                                                             
11  Although this argument is often cited, there have only been a few attempts to describe these 
types sufficiently from an ethnographic point of view (Schütze 1986, Vinken 2007). 
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low level in the first group of countries; by contrast, in the second group of 
countries there are legal claims and obligations to provide between the spouses 
after a divorce which are usually valid for life – except in the case of remar-
riage.12 
How are the two different divorce regimes linked to the different develop-
ments in fertility in the two groups of countries? How can the diminished rights 
for financial support of women in the first group of countries, which may be 
seen as unfavourable towards women, be reasoned as being to their advantage 
in the long term and a factor that promotes fertility? 
In our view, this change has four effects. The first concerns women’s em-
ployment. In the first group of countries (France, Sweden, the US), women 
with a traditional role (i.e., not employed) have to bear significantly higher 
costs of divorce than women who are in the labour force; as a result of this risk, 
this lifestyle is increasingly rare or is only chosen for a limited period. Even 
women with conservative attitudes are likely to seek employment in order to be 
able to provide for themselves, so that most women in this group of countries 
are less vulnerable should divorce occur. This may be seen as a behavioural 
adaptation that takes into account the increased risk of divorce. The second 
group of countries does not present such a clear incentive for a change in be-
haviour, even though it is frequently impossible to secure a traditional lifestyle 
after a divorce through alimony payments alone, because the economies of 
scale associated with a shared household no longer apply and the salary of the 
male breadwinner is too low to fully support two independent households (An-
dress 2003, 2009; Berghahn 2007).13 
The second effect of the divorce regime (as the flipside of the motivation for 
employment) relates to the vitality of the traditional role of the housewife. 
Social ideas must have a payout (Lepsius 1986) and institutions depend on 
resources to maintain their validity. While the traditional role of housewife has 
                                                             
12  In Germany, the law on alimony payments was changed on 1 January 2008. For all new 
divorce cases occurring after this date, the period of payment has now also been limited and 
the recipient’s obligation to gainful work strengthened (see § 1569 German Civil Code 
[BGB]: Principle of personal responsibility [Grundsatz der Eigenverantwortung]). A central 
feature of the previous child support law was known as the “age-grade regulation” (Alters-
gruppenregelung): The courts would set “age grades according to which a child from the 
age of eight to ten requires personal full-time childcare and therefore assumes no duty of 
the parent providing childcare to work. Up to this age, child support must be paid in full. 
After this point, partial employment is expected, the income of which can be added to the 
child support payments. Only when the child reaches the age of 16 does the expectation of 
the parent to return to work come into force in full and the claim to child support generally 
expires” (BVerfG 118, 45, 28 February 2007). 
13  In Switzerland there is currently a political debate on how to distribute the resultant risk in 
cases below the poverty line or social assistance level. While the current regulation puts the 
risk squarely on the non-earning or lower-earning partner, the minister in charge now pro-
poses to split the risk equally between both partners. This has already resulted in protest 
from men’s rights organisations. 
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been consistently devalued or “modernised” in the first group of countries, this 
has not been the case in the second group where women from the upper middle 
and upper classes are protected against the financial risks of divorce.14 To the 
extent that this social class embodies and establishes the core values for the rest 
of society, the traditional role of housewife is still valid here. Childcare at 
public institutions is seen as damaging and therefore its provision has been 
neglected. 
On a symbolic level one can see the divorce regime in the more modern 
group of countries (France, Sweden, US) as a certain familial reduction in 
status for children because fewer family resources are invested in them if 
mothers pursue a career and most of the childcare is left to a crèche or kinder-
garten. On the one hand, the ‘production’ of children is cheaper for these fami-
lies because the opportunity costs for mothers are lower and the household 
income is higher (which reduces the relative cost of having children); on the 
other hand, the behaviour of women is no longer fully focused on her children 
who are now in competition with her career goals. In its recent ruling on child 
support, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
avoided the use of the term “devaluation” and spoke instead of a reconciliation 
of interests that had become possible because educational research had shown 
the attendance of crèche and kindergarten as being beneficial to a child’s de-
velopment: this new regulation with external childcare at a kindergarten and 
the early return to gainful work for the parent providing childcare has “taken 
into account not only the parent providing childcare but also the parent respon-
sible for child support, as well as the child, and reconciled these interests with 
one another” (BVerG 118, 45, 28 February 2007). 
The third effect of the divorce regime concerns the coherence of state pol-
icy. The divorce regime of the more modern group of countries can be seen as 
the expression and cornerstone of a consistent overall policy direction which 
has a regulatory effect on labour market and social policy. While policies pur-
sue a clear goal in these countries – the integration of women into the labour 
market – they remain ambivalent in the second group. 
The fourth effect concerns men. Divorce not only threatens the interests of 
women but of men as well. As is the case for women, this is related to the 
definition of action spaces in terms of traditional gender roles, whereby the 
woman takes care of the household and raises the children while the man goes 
to work (e.g. Hausen 1976). Divorce renders this division of roles obsolete: 
women lack access to the labour market, and men lack access to their children.  
Although children are, economically speaking, for most people the most ex-
pensive investments (see BMFSFJ 1994, 145) and, psychologically speaking, 
the most meaningful investments in their lives, there is little information about 
                                                             
14  According to Weitzmann (1992), the US child support reforms of the 1970s targeted this 
group. 
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how frequently parent/child contact breaks down after a divorce (usually con-
tact to the father). In this respect, men are again the neglected gender in family 
research (as stated by Tölke and Hank 2005, who do not address this point). 
According to Hartl (2002), around 50% of West German and around 70% of 
East German fathers have no or only irregular contact with their children after a 
divorce (less than at least one contact per month, see also Tazi-Preve 2007). 
Sometimes it is assumed that men break off contact with their children because 
they are not able to engage with them without their wife (e.g. Furstenberg and 
Cherlin 1991, 26, who speak of a “package deal”). Given the high value of 
children it is more plausible that women act as ‘gatekeepers’ when it comes to 
regulating contact (see BMFSFJ 2005, 207), preventing their ex-husbands from 
seeing their children, or even using them as a weapon in the divorce conflict. In 
countries with a higher labour force participation (France, Sweden and the US, 
women have fewer incentives to deny their ex-husbands access to their children 
because their social status does not just come from the fact that they have chil-
dren (and from other attributes of the housewife role) but also from their own 
occupational career. In line with this assertion, the proportion of parents in the 
US breaking off contact with their children has decreased significantly over 
time (Amato, Meyers and Emery 2009, 47). In Sweden, divorce conflicts occur 
only rarely (Hobson and Morgan 2002).  
With this background, we may ask whether the strength of women and the 
weakness of men in terms of parent/child contact after a divorce is a reason 
why the desire for children is lower in men than in women (see Dobritz 2008, 
583). For investments to be made, there must be the expectation that they will 
pay out. This does not just apply to companies but also to families. Fertility 
decisions are decisions made jointly by women and men (Klein 2003); there-
fore the risk for fathers of losing the contact with their children after divorce 
also contributes to the fertility level of a society.  
6. Conclusion 
Fertility is affected by a wide range of factors, and accordingly, theories of 
fertility have been developed in several scientific disciplines which examine 
the issue from different perspectives. Specific theories have therefore only 
limited scope. Despite this necessary plurality of approaches, we assume that it 
is possible, using individualisation theory as a parsimonious framework con-
cept, to understand and explain many of the core points of fertility change in 
Western societies since the end of the 19th century. In doing so, we emphasise 
two dimensions of individualisation: firstly, the increase in status of the indi-
vidual – initially of the child, and then also of women – in cultural, social, 
economic and legal respects; secondly, the increase in autonomy and freedom 
of choice. In contrast to other approaches based on individualisation theory, we 
do not use the concept of self-realisation in the sense of an increased orienta-
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tion towards purely individual interests, not least because this concept has 
failed before the renewed rise in fertility that has recently been observed in 
some advanced societies. 
Like many other authors, we have argued that the first fertility decline was a 
result of the rapid increase in the status of children, which increased the costs 
of parenting and thus changed the interests of (potential) parents. Because 
contraception and family planning were already practised before the first 
demographic transition, as shown by historical demography, this development 
merely entailed a more intensive and rational use of these practices. In this 
sense, the increasing autonomy and freedom of choice was less significant than 
the rise in status of the child. 
This simple relationship was also influenced by other factors which may 
have accelerated or delayed the transition to families with fewer children. Our 
approach therefore does not claim to explain the full variation in fertility by 
itself. It should rather be seen as a framework concept that reconstructs the 
basic changes but must be supplemented by further parameters such as religion, 
labour market structure or the incipient interventions of the welfare state. 
In the second fertility decline since the 1960s, the two dimensions of indi-
vidualisation had a different causal relationship. As a result of the rapid rises in 
income, the increased direct costs of having children that resulted from the 
educational expansion played a less important role for families. In addition to 
the higher status of the child, the improvement in the status of women and their 
increasing participation in the educational system were also of major impor-
tance. With regard to the dimension of autonomy and freedom of choice, which 
we see as highly significant for the fertility decline, the new possibility of being 
able to dissolve a marriage devalued the traditional gender contract of the 
breadwinner/housewife model, which had an impact on the willingness of 
women and men to invest in marriage and children. 
As outlined above, Western societies took different paths in the 1970s in 
terms of the legal regulation of the consequences of divorce. While the Scandi-
navian countries, France and the US strictly limited the entitlements to child 
support through alimonies, the Geman-speaking countries institutionalised 
extensive entitlements for the mother and child in the divorce laws and thus 
emphasised the significance of the mother-child dyad. This decision led to a 
dead-end in many respects; the revision of the divorce regime in Germany 
through the Federal Constitutional Court and through the new law on alimony 
after divorce has (for the time being) ended this 30-year special path. 
From the point of view of these reforms, of women’s increasing labour mar-
ket orientation and of the incipient labour shortage resulting from the low fertil-
ity rates of previous decades, the German-speaking countries look set to follow 
the course of Sweden, France and the US in the coming years. High divorce 
rates can go along with high fertility rates if the costs of divorce are low to both 
men and women. This requires economically independent actors or, in other 
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words, a higher integration of women into the labour market. On the other 
hand, the other side of the traditional gender model must also change and men 
must be secured access to their children in order to make them ready to invest 
in parenthood. As suggested by the developments in Sweden, France and the 
US, these two aspects can go hand in hand if the traditional role of housewife 
assumes a lower significance. 
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